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THE LAW OF THE LAND
Roscoe POUND
Dean Harvard Law School
As we look out over the heterogeneous materials of a.law library
of any pretensions, at first sight there is a mass of obsolete or
obsolescent statutes, of forgotten, almost unreadable black letter
folios, of text books in crumbling law calf bindings covered with
dust, all of which in their time made part of the state of the law
at some given date, in some given place. Yet when we examine
that mass of material more closely, there seems to emerge out of
it a universal, permanent, enduring element which is in very truth
irrepealable. If we look only at the present, we seem to find
something that gives form and consistency to the legislation which
pours forth biennially or even annually from the lawmaking
bodies of forty-eight states. We seem to find something which
gives consistency and unity to the mass of decisions coming forth
from forty-eight Supreme Courts, each with full' authority to
declare the common law, from the Federal Supreme Court, and
nine Circuit Courts of Appeal, and from the courts of'England
and Ireland and Canada and Australia. Even more, as we look
back over the legal history of English-speaking peoples, we seem
to be conscious of something which binds the law of our time
and place, not merely to the law of Blackstone's time, not merely
to the classical common law of the time of Lord Coke, but even
to medieval English law-to the law of thirteenth-century England. Indeed, there are at least two states today which print
Magna Charta in the forefront of their statute books as presumably a part of their living law.
If we give to this permanent,. this enduring element, the name
of the common law, or its medieval name of the law of the land,
I suppose there is no phenomenon of our legal or social -istory

which is so marked as the persistence and the vitality of this law
of the land. It has come into competition with the great rival
tradition of the modern world many times and in many places,

and has never taken a backward step.

Only historians know that

the Custom of Paris once obtained in Michigan, Wisconsin and
Illinois. The map contains many reminders that the territory, of

those states was once politically French. But there is not an item
in their law today to suggest that historical fact. The SpanishRoman law was once in force in Florida, and architectural re-

mains of the Spanish regime are still to be seen.

But there is

not a mark upon the law of Florida today to indicate that it was
ever other than a common-law jurisdiction. With the one excep-

tion.of Louisiana, the great commonwealths which were carved out
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of the Louisiana purchase are common-law jurisdictions without a
mark upon their law to suggest that the French Roman law once
obtained over that domain. Even in Louisiana itself, which is
governed in form by a Civil Code translated almost word for
word from the Civil Code of France, the whole technique of
judicial precedents, the whole apparatus of finding the grounds
of decision in recorded judicial experience, has become that of
the common law. Except for the terminology of certain subjects,
except for family law, the law of inheritance, and some parts of
the law of property, the basis of the law in that jurisdiction has
become substantially the common law. Even more, wherever in
the modern world the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council extends over countries which had inherited
the civil law, more and more we find that their legal materials
are making over by our common law technique of precedents and
judicial action on the basis of reported decisions, and are ceasing
to be Roman Law in anything but terminology. Moreover, Scotland, which received the Roman Law in the sixteenth century,
has become more truly a common-law than a civil-law jurisdiction. If you leave out the Scotch Romanized terminology, you
will find that somehow or other, on points of divergence, the
English technique and the English doctrines have prevailed over
the methods and doctrines of Justinian's Digest.
Nor has the law of the land shown less of persistence and vitality in competition with other political and social forces. In the
twelfth century it came into conflict with the church, the most
powerful force in medieval society, and by the so-called compromise, which gave to the King's courts all that was worth while
in the way of jurisdiction over controversies between man and
man, it emerged definitely the victor. In the sixteenth century
when the reception of Roman law was going on throughout Western Europe, the common law stood steadfast, and England alone
of the great nations of that era of rising nationality did not replace
the law of the land by the Roman law. In the seventeenth century the common law doctrine of the supremacy of law came
into conflict with Stuart kings in a period of absolute government, in a time when passive obedience was the ruling political
dogma. A long and bitter struggle went on between common-law
courts and the Crown, and in the end the common law was able
to impose upon the Crown its doctrine that the King rules under
God and the law. In America, at the beginning of the nineteenth
century the law of the land was confronted by the rising tide of
Jeffersonian democracy. It was sore beset to overcome the
odium of its English origin at a time when all things English
were under suspicion and men were turning with favor to things
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French. Its ideas as to the obligation of contract were distasteful to debtors in an era of economic depression. Its doctrine of
the supremacy of the law, and consequent judicial power under
a written constitution, was distasteful to those who looked on
the legislature as preeminently representative of the popular will,
and conceived that judicial scrutiny of the translation of popular
impulse into chapter and section of the written law was nothing
short of usurpation. Yet the legal triumph of the common law
was no less complete than the political triumph of democracy.
Finally, at the beginning of the present century, the common law
came in conflict with the rising tide of social legislation, and
once more encountered the strongest force of the time. Agitation
for recall of judges and of judicial decision threatened the very
foundations of the law of the land, the independence of the
judiciary and the supremacy of law. Yet at the end of two
decades that agitation had subsided and the law of the land had
imposed upon a sovereigri people its doctrine that they, too, ruled
under God and the law.
Yet when we come to ask ourselves just what this law of the
land really is, just what it is that makes the law of forty-eight
states in the Union in essence one system, just what it is that
makes American law one with the law of England and Canada
and Australia, just what it is that gives continuity to the law of
English-speaking peoples today and the law of medieval England
-when
we ask this question and seek to answer it critically, I
venture to think we shall find it hard to put our finger upon
anything definite.
Certainly we cannot maintain that there is an identity or continuity of legal precepts. One need only pick up a volume of
Canadian reports or Australian reports or English reports or
reports of different states of this Union in order to see that the
actual precepts by which justice is administered differ notably
as you go from place to place. Diversity of geographical conditions, diversity of economic conditions, diversity of social conditions lead to palpable diversities in the legal precepts which
actually obtain in the different jurisdictions of the Englishspeaking world. Moreover, when we look back over our legal
history, we cannot but be struck with the relatively short life
of rules of law, that is of legal precepts affixing definite detailed consequences to definite detailed states of fact.
Not long since I had occasion to make a somewhat critical
study of one hundred and fifty years of American judicial de%cision, from the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress in 1774 to 1924. I soon found that I could not put my
finger upon much of anything in the reports of 1774 and say
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with honest conviction, "Here is a rule which actually obtains
in practice in the adjudication of causes in contemporary America." What do we find in the books of that time? They are
full of minutiae of procedure upon imprisonment for debt. They
are full of technical details about the settlement of paupers. They
are full of technical details of real actions and of the old feudal
land law, which was already dead in large part when it was imported to this country, and has had to be made over perhaps
more than once. They are full of the technicalities of the formal
over-refined procedure of the eighteenth century English law.
What were the first books that came out of American law
schools? The first effort of American legal writing in law
schools was a treatise on the law of Baron and Feme, the title
of which speaks for itself. The second in point. of time was a
treatise on real actions. Outside of New England that title
hardly evokes a memory in an audience of lawyers. Except as
the writ of entry survives in New England, it may be that an
occasional older lawyer may have read about real actions when
he read Blackstone in his youth. But I dare say he skipped that
part and.turned to parts that had some relevance to the matters
of the day.
Clearly we cannot find unity of law in English-speaking lands
and continuity of law, even from Blackstone's day to the present,
in any identity or continuity of legal precepts. Perhaps, then,
we are to find this unity and this continuity in certain principles.
It may be that there are certain fundamental, universal principles
which are to be found wherever English law has followed English
speech. It may be that this small fund of common principles
ties us to the Middle Ages and ties us to the law of England
and Canada and Australia. I would like to think that this is
true. And yet when we come to search for those principles, we
shall find them very elusive. Beyond a few fundamental ideas
of justice, which are common to civilized peoples, a small body
of axioms of justice which we share with the civil law, one
finds it very hard to put his finger upon a proposition and say,
"Here is an essential, characteristic, common-law principle, which
has obtained from the Middle Ages to the present, and obtains
wherever the English law obtains." We nay trace the beginning
of principles; we may see their rise and their fall. If we look into
the axioms of Doctor and Student, we shall not find one that is
of importance in the administration of justice today. If we
look at the principles laid down in Coke or Littleton as the foundations of legal reasoning they make us smile today, so scholastic,
so pedantic, so unrelated to what we think of as the realities
of justice do they appear. We cannot, I undertake to say, put a
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finger with confidence on any proposition and say, "Here is a
principle that binds us to the great English judges of the Middle
Ages-to Choke and Bryan and Fortescue-that binds the law
of the. Dakotas to the law of England and Canada and Australia."
Let me illustrate. Take such a supposedly fundamental
proposition as the one .by which we set so much store in the last
generation, namely, that there was to be no liability without fault
or undertaking; that a man's liability was to flow from intentfonal aggression, or from culpable conduct, or from voluntary
undertaking, and from these only. As late as the seventeenth
century this Was not true of trespass upon the person. It has
never been true as to trespassing animals. It has not been true
in England since 1865 with respect to things of potential danger
which one maintains rightfully upon his land. It ceased to be
true as to blasting operations in New York a good while ago when
such operations came into common use in connection with the
building trades. We can trace its beginning in the books. Likewise we can trace the growth of doubts and qualifications and explanations and exceptions which suggest that it may yet have an
end..
But there is another possibility. If this law of the land or
common law, of which we speak so confidently, is not a body of
precepts, and we cannot be sure that it is a body of principles, in
the sense of a body abiding, universal, authoritative premises for
legal reasoning, which distinguish our law from the law of
the Continent of Europe and its derivatives, perhaps the universal
and characteristic element of which we are in search is to be found
in certain institutions. It may be that there are certain peculiar
common-law institutions which mark off Anglo-American law
from the civil law, and which are to be found wherever the English law prevails. If there are such universal and characteristic
institutions, I suppose all would agree in pointing to three: The
doctrine of precedents, the doctrine of supremacy of law, and
trial by jury.
Certainly such a hypothesis is attractive. Yet the doctrine
of-precedents has been relaxing within the memory of those now
at the bar. Whatever our theory, our practice by no means gives
controlling weight to a single decision, as the lists of overruled
cases in every jurisdiction abundantly witness. And while we
are relaxing our doctrine, something very like it is growing up
in Continental Europe. Whatever the theory of the Civilians, in
practice, as recent French writers admit, the. course of decision
of the courts has-come to be a form of the law. Nor is it more
clear when we look critically at the doctrine of supremacy of law.
This doctrine has been: regarded as characteristically Anglo-Amer-
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ican. But it has been carried much further in this country than
in any other English-speaking land, in our doctrine of judicial
power with respect to unconstitutional legislation, and that doctrine has been worked out by courts in South Africa on the basis
of Roman Dutch and civil law authorities. Moreover, we are
developing something very like administrative law in England
and in the United States, while at the same time, when we look
at the administrative tribunals of France, for example, we soon
find that, whatever they are in name, in spirit and in conduct they
are ordinary courts. Thus Dicey's confident distinctions at least
lose their edge, and we cannot be so positive that we have here a
peculiar common-law institution.
As to trial by jury, the civil jury is almost extinct in England,
and there are signs that it is moribund in this country. Even
the criminal jury is uhder attack, and legislation modifying it, in
directions which may yet lead to extinction, is urged in more
than one state. The one feature upon which, perhaps, we may
put our finger with confidence, as an abiding universal commonlaw institution, is that mode of trial of cases as a whole which has
grown out of the exigencies of jury trial. As to that, we must
remember that such was the Roman mode of trial. Nor should
we overlook that the exigencies of causes involving expert evidence have been pushing us in more than one instance in the
direction of inquisitorial rather than controversial procedure.
Moreover, if we have some residium of permanent, universal,
characteristic common-law institutions we must note that today
they are under attack from every side. For one thing there is
legislation. You may say that the danger from legislation is not
great. It deals with transient details, not with enduring principles. The common law gives a background to legislation which
moulds legislation to its dogmas. Legislation is interpreted by
common-law canons and is given shape by the received ideas of
a profession trained in the common law. Moreover, if you look
into legislation it does not always seem to carry with it a danger
to the common law. I like to think of a statute by which it was
enacted that "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to
discharge any loaded firearm or firearms in, along, or upon any
public road or highway in the state, except for the purpose of
killing some noxious or dangerous animal or an officer in the
pursuit of his duty." No doubt common-law institutions are in
no great danger from such legislation. Yet as one studies legislation its corrosive and destructive possibilities cannot but be
brought home to him.
Thus, in England today by statute the real property of a deceased passes to hi- administrator.. In Oklahoma today by statute
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the personal property of a deceased person passes to his heirs.
In other words, we have here two radically different statutory
alterations of what had been supposed to be a fundamental common-law dogma. Nor is that an isolated instance. Consider the
growing frequency of statutory crimes without mens rea which go
counter to the very common-law conception of a crime. Consider
the growth of statutory liens of all sorts whereby we are coming
to forget the nature of a lien at common law. Consider the continual legislative development of negotiability at the expense of
the common law dogma that one can transfer nothing more than
he has. Legislation is continually undermining legal precepts,
legal dogmas, and legal principles which we had identified with
the common law.
But legislation is not all. A much more serious phenomenon
is the rise of administrative jurisdiction. Within a generation
there has been a wonderful development of administrative justice.
I would not decry this development for a moment. No doubt it
was inevitable. No doubt administrative justice is called for in
increasing measure by the rise of an urban industrial society
where we had a rural agricultural society. But let us note its
effect upon what we should conventionally think of as common
law.
What is the characteristic method of the administrative tribunal as contrasted with the common-law tribunal ? Is it not that the
former seeks to individualize the treatment of cases, whereas
the latter seeks to treat each case as but an example of some
type to be referred to some legal principle? Recently I was talking with a physician about this growing tendency to individualize
the treatment of controversies. "Why," he said to me, "the same
thing is happening in medicine. When I came into the profession we used to treat the lungs, the liver, the heart, the stomach,
as if they existed of themselves. We found a man whose symptoms indicated trouble with his lungs, his liver, his heart, or his
stomach. Our books told us what to do for the- abstract lungs,
the abstract liver, the abstract heart, the abstract stomach, and we
treated him accordingly. Today," he said "we have learned to
deal with John Doe and Richard Doe whose lungs or liver 6r
heart or stomach are not functioning as they should."
Now it is that same tendency, which we find in every field
of human activity today, that is bringing us to attempt individualization of legal remedial treatment; that is leading us to proceed
by affording guidance to the actual business of the actual man
as it must be dealt with in the crowded world of time, if business
is to go on, rather than by prescribing abstract formulas for ab-
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stract businesses. So I do not for a moment fear anything from
this rise of adininistrative justice in and of itself. And yet let
us look at it from the standpoint of the common law.
In his Second Institute, Lord Coke tells us that there can be
nothing in the way of oppression between man and man and nothing affecting the life or liberty or fortune of the subject, and no
manner of misgovernment, but that it shall be reviewed ultimately
in the King's courts and due correction be made. Such was the
common-law ideal, and such was the practice of common-law
countries from the seventeenth century at least till the beginning
of the present century.
But times change. In England the House of Lords now holds
that in an administrative appeal from an administrative officer
to an administrative appellate tribunal, the ordinary decencies of
judicial appellate procedure do not obtain, that the tribunal may
act on a secret report of an inspector who makes a secret inspection which the appellant may not see, may not criticize or contradict, and may not explain by independent evidence or extrinsic
argument. It now holds that provided the administrative appellate tribunal applies its ordinary procedure and deals with John
Doe's case or Richard Doe's as it habitually deals with any one
else's, there can be no complaint even though its mode of dealing
with the case is that of Haroun al Raschid or of St. Louis under
the oak at Vincennes. 'Where the common law thought-of every
case as one of a type, so that the decision was to be referred
to.some principle governing a group or a class of cases, so that
it was necessary to hear arguments in order to insure right classification and accurate generalization, administration thinks of each
case as :unique, or seizes upon its unique features, and deals with.
it concretely as if no other case like it ever existed or could ever
come.before the tribunal. In such a view the next case will not
be.affected by what i§ done and no argument is needed to insure
a correct solution of future controversies.
Well, you will say, that is England, and we all know that queer
things have been happening 'in that ancient Kingdom.; that for
some .time the mother country has been edging toward socialism
in legislation, and so. why not in judicial- decision. But let us
look at our own administrative law. In the same year in which
the House, of. Lords was deciding that an administrative. appeal
might be heard after the manner of Haroun al Raschid, it
happened:in one .of the largest cities of the land that an employee
of an ice company came home one evening in a very dilapidated
condition.. He was shaky, nervous and pale and had no appetite
for his supper. When his wife asked him what was the matter
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he said that the boys had been putting in ice in the basement of
Hogan's saloon and that a three hundred pound block of ice had
fallen on him and had shaken him up badly. He got no better.
His wife sent for a physician to whom he told the same story.
The physician looked him over and sent him to a hospital, where
he died the next morning-of delirium tremens. His widow
brought in a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act for
the death due to an injury in the course of her husband's employment. In the course of investigation of her claim it appeared
that there was no abrasion or mark or bruise upon the body of
the deceased. Also from the unanimous testimony of those who
had been at work upon the wagon that morning, it appeared-that
he had spent his time neither upon the ice wagon nor upon the
water wagon, but that while the ice was being put into the basemgnt of Hogan's place he was at all times in the interior thereof
laying the foundation of the fatal attack which took him off ,the
next morning. But the statpte said that, in administering the act,
the commission was not to be governed by the technical rules of
evidence; and it seemed to the commissioners a highly'technical
rule of evidence to require proof of any causal connection between the employment on the ice wagon and: the fatal result.
Likewise when the case came before-the highest. court in the
state that court found itself much embarrassed. The testimony
as to what the husband said was before the administrative tribunal as evidence. If the tribunal chose to act on that evidence to
the exclusion of the evidence of all who had immediate first-hand
knowledge, if it was the regular wont of the tribunal to proceed
on such testimony as a basis of award in the face of the manifest
evidence, how was the court to interfere? If the commission
proceeded not on a general principle of causation, but on a principle of distribution of the economic surplus with, reference to
the immediate parties to the claim, could the court insist on the
judicial rather than the administrative attitude? You will perceive how fundamental common-law ideas are subject to corrosion and destruction in this rise of administrative justice.
But legislation and administration are not alone in this tendency to treat every situation as unique. When we come to study
current adjudication we may perceive the same corroding process.
The courts of forty-eight states, each with a mouth speaking
great things, are competent to lay down the common law and
determine what shall be the universal common law for each particular jurisdiction. Hitherto, the art of the. common-law lawyer's craft, applied to the authoritative traditional legal materials,
, kept a-reasonable uniformity. Very likely it will continue to do
so. But note how the reasonable uniformity may be in the administrative direction. Note, for example, what has been happen-
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ing to the fundamentals of agency. At common law, a parent is
not responsible for the independent tort of his child. He is not
liable unless some agency of the child can be made out; unless
the child was acting on the concerns of the parent and within the
scope thereof, or unless the parent himself was in some way at
fault. But these propositions'have been much shaken of late by
the rise of the judicial doctrine of the family automobile. If
little Willie took out the family horse and buggy he could not do
much in the way of damage to any one but his father. So the
courts asked: Was he an agent? Was his father culpable in
allowing him to be at large with the horse and buggy? Or was
Willie out unknown to his parents on a frolic of his own? But
the automobile is such a dangerous instrument, and its possession
seems to indicate such affluence on the part of the parent, that
regard for an equitable distribution of the economic surplus as
between the parties to a particular cause, has called for invention
of the judicial doctrine of the family automobile. It has been
suggested that the principle behind that doctrine is qui facit per
auto facit per se.
But enough of examples. I submit that in legislation, in administration, and even in judicial decision, we may see a steady
wearing away of what we had regarded as common-law principles, of what we had taken to be fundamental common-law doctrines and dogmas. Now I do not fear this process. I do not
believe that it portends any evil, I do not believe that it is a symptom of decay, legal or moral or political. Legal history is full
of such things. There are eras of legal stability and there are
eras of legal growth. When for a time the rise of new interests
or new conflicts of interests call for new adjustments, we revert
for a season to a process of trial and error until we learn how to
do things better. In that process of trial and error there is
always bound to be not a little of error.
Shall we say, then, that there is no common. law except in
historical retrospect? Shall we say there is no irreversable, irrepealable, enduring element in American law? Shall we say
there is but a mere illusion of continuity in our legal history, with
nothing but a common historical origin behind us and the Courts
of Westminster? Shall we say that nothing but a certain common historical terminology holds together the law of England,
of the United States, of Canada and of Australia?
They tell a story of the great Bishop Wilberforce, that when
he became Bishop he made a, resolution that he would visit every
parish in his diocese, and thus would keep up its spiritual life.
Accordingly, in due course, he went into one remote parish where
there. was a fine old fox-hunting parson who was wont to go
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through the morning service pretty rapidly and then get on his
horse and go about his more immediate pursuits. The Bishop
was much shocked. He said to the parson: "This won't do.
We must have some spiritual life in this parish." "Well," said
the parson, "I thought so, too, when I came here forty years
ago. But forty years in this parish tend to disabuse one of such
ideas." "Oh," said the Bishop, "that won't do. I will show you
what you should do. I will come down here next Sunday and
preach and set you an example." So the next Sunday the Bishop
came and preached as only he could on the text, "The fool hath
said in his heart there is no God." After the service the parson
said, "Now we sfiall see what the parish makes of the sermon."
So he sent for Hodge, an honest old farmer, to come up and be
presented to the Lord Bishop. Hodge came twisting his cap in
his hand and very much embarrassed, and was duly presented.
"Now, Hodge," said the parson, "tell the Lord Bishop what you
thought of the sermon." "Oh, my Lord," said Hodge, "it were
a powerful sermon; it were indeed a powerful sermon. But, my
Lord, I cannot help thinking there do be a God after all."
After all the doubts I have expressed as to the hypothesis of
a universal, enduring continuous common law, I still feel that
there "do be" a common law after all, and I shall venture to suggest to you where I think it may be found. For I submit that our
trouble comes at bottom from a certain ambiguity in the term
"law." It comes from our thinking of law as something simple.
It comes from our thinking of lawas merely an aggregate of laws
and from thinking of laws as rules-as simply definite precepts
attaching definite detailed legal consequences to definite detailed
states of fact. Undoubtedly such rules-for example, the Rule in
Shelley's Case, the statutory rules as to the number of witnesses
required for a will, the rule as to what words are words of negotiability, and as to the effect of such words-such rules are a very
important element in the law. Some of them are traditional. Some
of them are statutory. But such rules are not all even of the body
of legal precepts of which we commonly think when we speak of
the law. Along with such rules there are principles, authoritative starting points for legal reasoning, such as the principle that
one person is not to be enriched unjustly at the expense of another, or that one who does something which on its face is injurious to another must answer for the consequences unless he can
justify. Here no definite detailed legal results are prescribed
for any definite detailed state of facts. There are no rules.
There are instead premises from which to deduce rules. Then,
too, there are other precepts which enjoin conformity to certain
standards, like the standard of due care which we apply to all
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conduct, or the standard of fair conduct which we apply to fiduciaries, or the standard of reasonable facilities and reasonable
rates and reasonable service which we apply to public utilities.
It will be seen that even the element of legal precepts is far from
simple.
Over and above the mass of legal precepts, however, there
are other elements which are no less a part of the authoritative
apparatus" with which justice is administered every day in the
courts. One of those elements is a traditional technique of finding the grounds of decision in the mass of precepts both statutory
and traditional; a technique of developing the grounds of decision
of particular cases out of the authoritative materials; a technique
of shaping precepts to meet new situations, of developing principles to meet new cases, and of working out from our whole
body of legal materials the precepts appropriate to the concrete
situation here and now. This element is, as it were, the art
of the common-law lawyer's craft.
Another element in the law is a body of received ideals of
the social order, and so of the legal order; a body of received
ideals of what law is and .what law is for, and so of what legal
precepts and legal principles ought to be, and how they ought to
be applied in the light thereof. These ideals are the background
of all judicial action, whether in finding law, in interpreting it,
or in applying it. They give content and form to legal precepts
and dictate their application. This is the element we have in
mind when we -speak of law as universal and rooted in the eternal verities. It is this element which the philosophical jurist has
in mind when he tells us that law cannot -be made but can only
be found. With his eye on this element only he thinks of legislation not as creative, but as a mere formulating process. As he
sees it, the reality of law is in this ideal element; legislator and
judge do no more than give definite formulation to details
drawn from this ideal picture of the whole. English and American lawyers have been wont to ignore this element and to look
exclusively at the element of legal precepts. But to understand
law, to administer justice according to law, and to make law, we
must understand all three.
When we look at these three elements which go to make
up the law, it is evident that the element of legal precepts is more
or less fleeting. By going through the reports at intervals of
about fifty years, it can be shown that for practical purposes the
whole body of precepts changes in not much more than a generation. I suppose when you think about the law today you are
likely to think of contracts and-torts as the great subjects. But
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if you look in Blackstone for what we call the law of contracts
today, you may look a long time and find very little. And as to
Torts, the first book upon that subject was written in 1859, and
as late as 1874 there were doubts whether there was such a thing
as the law of torts. The law which was significant one hundred
and fifty years ago, real actions, the technicalities of the feudal
land law, the settlement of paupers, imprisonment for debt, the
Well,
niceties of eighteenth-century common-law practice
"Where are the snows of yesteryear ?" The law of taxation, the
subject which is to the fore in the reports of today, was scarcely
heard of a generation ago.
-

Received ideals, the third element in the law, are not so fleeting. Relatively they have a long life. Though they, too, change,
they change slowly. That this element does change may be seen
readily when we compare the received ideals of the age of Coke,
when lawyers still thought in terms of the relationally organized
society of the Middle Ages, with the received ideals of the last
generation, influenced profoundly by the classical economics, by
the political ideas of the French Revolution, and by the identification of the immemorial common-law rights of Englishmen with
the natural rights of man. The controlling part which these received ideals play in judicial decision is made manifest whenever
courts are called upon to apply to social legislation the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. That some change may
be taking place is suggested by the common phenomenon of five
to four decisions in such cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
But the element which is enduring, the element which gives
consistency, unity, and continuity to .the law, the element which
distinguishes the common law from the civil law, the element
which makes us conscious of a real unity of English law and
American law and Canadian law and Australian law, is the traditional art of the lawyer's craft, the traditional technique of
deciding cases on the basis of recorded judicial experience, of
applying legal materials, and shaping them and reshaping. them
and developing them as the exigencies of the administration of
justice require. There is the decisive point-of difference between
the common law and the civil law.
From Roman times the civiliaris technique has been one of
interpreting, developing,: and applying written texts. To the
civilian the form of the-law is typically that of a code, ancient
or moderri. When he is confronted with a case requiring decision, he manipulates the authoritative texts by his traditional
technique. His method is one of logical development and logical
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exposition of supposedly universal propositions. To him- the
oracles of the law are academic teachers, the books of authority
are codes, and the text books are commentaries upon codes. The
whole tradition is one of the logical handling of written texts.
On the other hand, our common-law technique is a technique
of developing and applying judicial experience. It is a technique
of finding the grounds of decision in the reported cases. It is a
technique of shaping and reshaping principles drawn from recorded judicial decisions. The oracles of our law are not teachers but judges. Our books of authority are reports of adjudicated cases. Our text books are treatises on subjects of the law
developed through comparison and analysis of recorded judicial
experience.
More important, however, ,as I see it, is the frame of mind
that lies behind this traditional technique of the common-law
lawyer. It is a frame of mind which looks at things in the concrete, not in the abstract; which puts its faith in experience
rather than in abstractions. It is a frame of mind which prefers
to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this
case or that case to the next case, as justice in each case seems
to require, instead of trying to refer everything back to supposed
universals. It is a frame of mind which is not ambitious to
formulate universal propositions and disinclined to deduce the
decision for the case in hand from a proposition formulated universally, as like as not by one who had never conceived of the
problem by which jurist or tribunal is confronted. In other
words, our technique rests on that surefooted Anglo-Saxon habit
of dealing with things as they arise in the light of experience,
instead of putting one's faith in abstract formulas.
If the spirit of this art of the common-law lawyer's craft is
the spirit of the common law, it seems to me our most precious
legal possession. It is the duty of the common-law lawyer to
preserve this attitude of mind in its full vigor, that it may be
handed down as as living instrument of justice among all Englishspeaking peoples.
PRESIDENT:

Dean Pound, we are grateful to you for this

message. I don't know how you feel but we think it was worth
your trip from Massachusetts out here.
MR. KNAUFF: Some I8 or 19 years ago I attended a meeting of the State Bar Association at which time we listened to
Dean Pound, and after the meeting we moved by a rising vote
that the Dean be made an HONORARY member of the organization. Since thlit time we have been incorporated as a Bar
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Association under the laws of the State of North Dakota, and
it seems to me proper at this time, and I therefore move, that
Dean Pound be made an HONORABLE member -of the North
Dakota Bar Association, and that his address be printed and distributed in our regular report.
PRESIDENT:

MEMBER:

Do I hear a second?

I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, you have heard the motion, as many
as are in favor of the motion signify by rising. (All rise.)
PRESIDENT:

You may be seated.

Any who are opposed.
Dean, I knew there was some cause for your greatness, some
cause for your wisdom, now I know what it is, and I presume
that it began back in Valley City, eighteen years ago when we had
the pleasure of constituting you an honorary member of the law
fraternity of this State. Now I have the pleasure and honor of
constituting you a member, and this time an honorable member,
of the Bar Association of this State.
We will now resume our business. I hope that none of the
lawyers will retire as we have the election of officers and other
important matters to take up.
We are going to take up for consideration first the report of
the Criminal Law Committee. That is the unfinished order of
business. We were considering the report of the Criminal Law
Committee on a substitute motion. A motion was first made for
the adoption of the report, carrying an adoption of the recommendations and then a substitute motion was made, if I recall
correctly. If not, I will ask the stenographer to correct me. The
substitute motion was made by Mr. Cuthbert and seconded by
Mr. Bangs that the report be received and printed and its consideration postponed until the next session of the Bar Association at the next annual meeting. Are there any remarks on the
substitute motion?
MR. STUTSMAN:

I would like to know what the concrete
objections to that report are. I have heard the gentlemen, in general terms, speak about the presumption of guilt, but I did not
hear them make any concrete objections to the report. I would
be glad to hear what they are. I am in favor of the report.
MR. BANGS: That is in part directed to me, as I am the person who seconded the substitute motion. I am not in position
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to say that I have no objection to the report because I only heard
it read this morning, rapidly, and I have had no opportunity to
consider it. I do not know just what the report is, and I venture
to say that, unless Mr. Stutsman has had occasion to see the report he can't get up now and tell the audience what the report is
and what the recommendations are. Perhaps he has a memory
to carry that through, but some of us haven't. I don't know
what the report is, and I don't know what the recommendations
are, but I do know that the subject is important and I want to
know about it before I vote.
I would like to find out and discuss the
MR. STUTSMAN:
different recommendations one by one. My recollection is that
there are a half dozen recommendations that were made a year
ago by this committee that were not incorporated into law, notwithstanding the fact that they were recommended for passage.
One refers to capital punishment. That is the way I remember
it, and the committee recommends that the Legislature adopt a
bill for capital punishment. I am for it. The other recommendations are more or less important and they should be thoroughly
discussed and this is the time to do it. I don't see any occasion
for passing it over to next year because we did not catch the
recommendations.
MR. CUTHBERT: If it is so very important to hang a man, I
may withdraw my objection if Mr. Stutsman will tell me whom
he has in mind. Outside of that I cannot see the terrible rush
that Mr. Stutsman or any other lawyer may have for such drastic
legislation, particularly in view of the fact that the Legislature
will not meet until after our next annual meeting. Now I respectfully submit to this Bar that the report was never placed in
our hands; that we have had no opportunity to study the recommendations embodied therein; and that in many respects it advo-cates things revolting to our established lractice; that it is not
necessary for us at this time without study of the recommendations, to pass it, but that it can be allowed to stand until our next
meeting; that if we adopt it now people will assume that we are
willing to let a man holding the position of Attorney General
come here and read a report and then without deliberation adopt
that report with the same unhesitancy that they adopt a resolution at some Sunday School picnic. I am going to move again
and I hope it will carry, that the report be filed and distributed
to the bar and that it be carried over for further discussion and
vote to our next meeting.
Before dinner I was rather anxious to speak
MR. FttTHAM:
on this subject and after consideration I have decided to speak.

BAR ASSOCIATION OF NORTH DAKOTA

183

For a matter of fifteen years I have not tried a criminal case in
District Court. Prior to that I tried a great nmany and I am able
to sit back a little bit further than some of the attorneys who
have been talking and arguing, and I look at this matter as a
citizen of the United States and not as an attorney. And, Mr.
President, though we are a body of attorneys, in my judgment
that is the way this matter should be considered. There is no
reason for anything heated on- the part of Mr. Cuthbert or Mr.
Stutsman or Mr. Bangs. We are up against a cold-blooded
proposition. A proposition that appeals to all of you as citizens.
We are confronted by a condition, not by a theory over this land.
The criminal can make a living at the expense of his fellows. He
is going over the state robbing our people and robbiiigs banks
and committing murder. He is going through the State armed
and ready to perform a murder at any time it becomes necessary.
We are dealing with the protection of a citizen against banditry
organized in Chicago, in Philadelphia and Atlanta; in States
further east and preying upon us, and who, according to statements of the Attorney General, have one chance in ten of being
caught. Now while I have not been in the active practice so
as to try a criminal case in fifteen.years, I have been somewhat
in touch with the situation and I haven't seen any difficulty in
the matter of conviction of criminals after they had been caught.
my mind any.case of any profesI haven't been able to recall in.
sional criminal who was caught and brought before the bar of
justice who was not easily and comfortably convicted. Now if
my recollection of that matter is true, isn't that part of the report
of this committee which seeks to give the prosecuting officers
more power than they now have and take from the defendant
certain rights, is it right that it should be adopted, is it necessary ?
That is not our. trouble. Our courts are swift; our punishment
is regular and there is no necessity of changing the practice.
You bring a criminal into this County and let him rob a bank
and let us get him with the evidence on him and he will be in the
penitentiary inside of six months. There is no reason- why we
should take from the. honest, who. may sometimes be charged
with a crime, the rights and privileges with which the law, from
the day of the Magna Charta, has surrounded him. I am free
to say that I have not the greatest 'faith and confidence in the
fairness of prosecuting officers of any County or City. I have
seen cases where they took unfair advantage of defendants, and
I have seen .at least one man railroaded to the penitentiary.. I
want to say the time has not come to take from the Englishspeaking people the rights the English-speaking people have had
since the day of King John. 'With reference to that part of the
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recommendations, that part should be scrutinized with great care.
Prosecuting officers are bound up in the idea of prosecution, and
have a one-track mind with reference to prosecution and don't
think of the rights of the common people. Who knows but what
you or I or any of us here may be standing before the bar of
justice fighting for our rights. We desire to be protected by
the rights that the English-speaking people have always had. So
much for that.
I now pass to the matter of this transient criminal. That is
what is threatening us; that is the man from whom we have to
guard ourselves. How shall we guard ourselves? State police,
in my judgment, would be a satisfactory thing and if added might
possibly add one per cent to the number of convictions that
would come in. But you are going to find that the men who rob
banks are professional criminals with automobiles and they are
going to get in and out of the State as fast as they can and as
soon as they pass out of the State there is only one chance in ten
of being caught. How are we going to keep them out of the
State? That is the question that we are interested in. In this
State we must pass laws which will put the fear of the law in
their hearts and we must pass laws which the juries will carry
into effect and we must produce to the Legislature laws which
they will pass.
MR. LIBBY: I have not imposed myself upon this Association, but I would like some little time on my report of the Committee on Memorials and I want to warn the brothers, that the
hour-is getting late and I now move the substitute motion.
MEMBER:

I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: As many as are in favor of the substitute motion, which is in substance the postponing of this subject till the
next general meeting and the acceptance and printing of the
report will signify by saying "aye." Those opposed "no." Motion is carried.

MR. MeCeUty: I would like to move that a copy of this report be printed and supplied and sent to each member of the
Association, so that this matter may be considered at three o'clock
on the first day of the next meeting.
MEMBER:

I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: You have heard the motion. It is not necessary
to repeat it. Are there any remarks? If not, those in favor
will signify by saying "aye." Motion carried. The matter will
be referred to the Executive Committee -for action.
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We will now take the report of the last committee, the Committee on Memorials. Before the chairman makes the report I
want to say a word. He and his committee, and as usual he
has been the committee, have done a lot of work in preparing
suitable resolutions for those of our members who have gone.
Mr. Libby, I ask you to give the report of your committee at this
time.
MR. LIBBY: Mr. President and gentlemen of the Association:
Many subjects of great interest not only to the Bar of the State
but to the State at large have come before this meeting. There
have been a good many discussions and they have been very interesting to me and many times during the past two days I have
felt like talking a little myself but I refrained from it. At a
meeting of this character, where so much diversity of opinion
exists, where so many subjects are discussed and so many matters are settled for the next year, there is much work to be done
and I here now compliment the president, Brother McIntyre, on
his fairness, on his dignity and on his patience during the last
two days. It is a trying position, but he has handled the situation
most beautifully.
I will now submit the report of the Committee on Memorials.
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